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Abstract
The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) drastically in-
creases the number of connected devices in homes, work-
places and smart city infrastructures. This drives a need
for means to not only ensure confidentiality of device-
related communications, but for device configuration and
management—ensuring that only legitimate devices are
granted privileges to a local domain, that only authorized
agents have access to the device and data it holds, and
that software updates are authentic. The need to sup-
port device on-boarding, ongoing device management
and control, and secure decommissioning dictates a suite
of key management services for both access control to
devices, and access by devices to wireless infrastructure
and networked resources. We identify this core function-
ality, and argue for the recognition of efficient and reli-
able key management support—both within IoT devices,
and by a unifying external management platform—as a
baseline requirement for an IoT world. We present a
framework architecture to facilitate secure, flexible and
convenient device management in commodity IoT sce-
narios, and offer an illustrative set of protocols as a base
solution—not to promote specific solution details, but to
highlight baseline functionality to help domain owners
oversee deployments of large numbers of independent
multi-vendor IoT devices.
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) involves connecting and
managing enormous numbers of devices in wide-ranging
applications, from commodity retail products to ad-
vanced medical devices and autonomous vehicles. The
scale is such that traditional solutions for device associ-
ation and management become obsolete. The problem is
exacerbated by individual IoT device manufacturers pro-
moting vendor-specific solutions for device onboarding
and management; unsurprisingly, interoperable key man-
agement solutions for IoT devices are as yet unknown.
This increases the burden on the owner of an IoT trust
domain—e.g., an IoT-enabled residence, industrial build-
ing, or metropolitan infrastructure—as numerous distinct
IoT device management applications must be used for
common tasks related to connectivity and security such
as software/firmware updates, and changing passwords
to a domain wireless access point. Many device man-
ufacturers provide only rudimentary management tools,
leaving keying, configuration and software management
for domain owners to address manually, or removing all
user control over when or if software updates occur. Be-
yond major new burdens, possible mis-configuration puts
at risk the security of entire trust domains.
To address these issues, we outline a novel key man-
agment framework for commodity IoT domains. It
adopts a guardian model [7]. A configurable interme-
diate entity, the KMI (Key Management Infrastructure)
Guardian, controls security-relevant aspects of the life-
cycle of IoT devices. We ground the framework architec-
ture on a taxonomy of IoT devices (Section 2), which di-
vides IoT devices into three broad qualitative categories
(high-end, mid-level, low-end) based on computational
and communication capabilities. As we assume pre-
mium devices will follow advanced vendor-specific secu-
rity frameworks, our framework focuses on commodity
devices, providing support for authentication, authoriza-
tion and integrity verification.
The Guardian manager is designed to work in parallel
with vendor-specific, device-specific applications which
control fine-grained IoT device functionality; it aggre-
gates lifecycle aspects related to access control, network
connectivity, security and privacy, addressing head-on
the complexity arising from ownership of large numbers
of heterogeneous devices from a wide spectrum of inter-
national manufacturers with whom domain owners have
no meaningful relationship, yet whose commodity de-
vices require ongoing, individual care and feeding.
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2 IoT Landscape (Use Environments)
The space of IoT devices is booming, with an exploding
number of device manufacturers introducing new devices
with network connectivity. The related promise of the
ability to supervise and control devices remotely has led
the adoption of an IoT paradigm in a variety of applica-
tion scenarios. We mention three briefly: smart homes,
smart cities/buildings, and industrial IoT. We then briefly
discuss categories of IoT devices.
1) Smart Homes. IoT in smart homes currently tar-
gets small-scale, commodity devices allowing home-
owners to monitor, control and automate elements of
their home environment. Typical devices in this set-
ting include smart light bulbs, power plugs, doorbells,
IP cameras, and a multitude of sensor-enabled appli-
ances. Sophistication level and price range varies greatly.
Countless device vendors already offer products in this
category, with significant heterogeneity in device de-
sign and software solutions. Among premium manu-
facturers of smart home devices (e.g., Samsung, Apple,
Google/Nest), some devices are part of full-stack product
solutions with integrated device-family management and
operation. More commonly, management solutions lack
integration, with independent means for on-boarding, ac-
cess control and managing software updates; we refer to
these as commodity devices.
2) Smart Cities and Buildings. The building of IoT
devices into infrastructures is referred to as smart city or
smart building scenarios. These may involve devices that
satisfy special requirements, e.g., with regard to protec-
tion against rough environmental conditions caused by
rain, dust, heat or low temperatures. Devices in these sce-
narios may also employ special long-range radio com-
munication protocols or cellular access instead of ‘stan-
dard’ WiFi or Ethernet-based communication links, in
order to be deployable in a wide area with different en-
vironmental settings. These specialized scenarios with
highly customized devices in large-scale device networks
with comparatively high per-unit costs mandate device
vendors to provide customized solutions for device de-
ployment and management allowing automated, central-
ized mass provisioning of devices. These fall outside our
key management architecture for commodity devices.
3) Industrial IoT. As with smart city/smart building
settings, industrial solutions are characterized by signif-
icantly larger scale of the targeted systems and special
environmental requirements towards devices. Also here,
management solutions are tailored by system vendors
to meet special requirements of the deployment envi-
ronment of particular industrial environments. As such,
large parts of industrial IoT are beyond the scope of our
IoT key management framework, however our frame-
work remains suitable for smaller-scale industrial envi-
ronments, and individual departments within larger orga-
nizations, when these units use commodity IoT devices.
Categories of IoT devices (taxonomy). IoT devices
can be characterized according to their properties re-
lated to: processing capabilities, memory, operating sys-
tem, energy consumption, communication protocols and
encryption capabilities. For background context, Ap-
pendix A.1 discusses such characteristics, with focus on
IoT devices typical in smart home environments, the
main target for our proposal. Appendix A.2 then uses
these to classify IoT devices in three categories: high-
end, mid-level and low-end. Smart home devices in
our target scope fall in the mid-level and low-end cat-
egories, which have sufficient computing and memory
resources to execute suitably customized (e.g., ECDH
PAKE) protocols for establishing keying relationships
with the Guardian per Section 6.2. Beyond our scope are
devices—not always more powerful in the sense of be-
ing high-end (above)—from premium vendors providing
vendor-specific on-boarding and device-family manage-
ment applications integrated with on-line services.
At the lowest-capability end of the commodity con-
sumer device market are “extremely constrained” de-
vices, not prevalent in smart home networks. Termi-
nology for constrained, IP-connected nodes is defined
by RFC 72281, distinguishing Class 0, 1 and 2 nodes
based on resources available on low-end devices. The
most constrained (Class 0) devices fall clearly below our
scope—most simple sensor devices we have examined
provide significantly more resources. All devices we
classify as low-end (Table 1, Appendix A.2) fall in RFC
7228 Classes 1 and 2; for context, our mid-level devices
are clearly beyond Class 2 capabilities.
3 Key Management supporting Life-Cycle
An IoT key management system must support operations
involving crypto keys throughout the typical life cycle of
IoT devices. As discussed here, these include: device on-
boarding (establishing an initial keying relationship with
a new device); key lifecycle management; administra-
tive access control to devices; verification of software
updates; and integrity verification of device state.
IoT key management requirements follow closely
from the life-cycle of an IoT device. Typical stages and
relevant events are as follows.
S1: Device registration and on-boarding. Installation in
trust domain T includes: establishing connectivity
with T , establishing keys for authentication, access
control, and secure communication.
1https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7228
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S2: Configuration and mainstream use. This includes:
secure transmission of device sensor data; secure
remote access by owner (to examine state, change
parameters); event logging if appropriate.
S3: Software/firmware update. For simplicity, we as-
sume that essential state is maintained across any
power losses or battery replacements.
S4: Device removal from domain (decommissioning,
e.g., due to obsolesence or transfer to new owner).
This includes: deleting sensitive state, including
recorded data, domain passwords and keys.
We next comment on aspects of these stages.
Device on-boarding. In typical IoT scenarios, no
prior security context exists between a trust domain and a
device to be added to it. Keying relationships must thus
be set up. Traditional ad-hoc key establishment means
face challenges in IoT scenarios—e.g., the number of de-
vices precludes extensive user involvement in terms of
physical contact with the device, or of entering or verify-
ing authentication secrets between the onboarded device
and another domain-related management device.
Solutions requiring physical contact with each device
may be impractical in terms of manual labor cost in IoT
scenarios involving tens or hundreds of devices (home
environments), not to mention thousands of devices (e.g.,
smart bulbs in industrial IoT or smart building scenarios).
Such physical electrical contact with a new device for
securely transferring key material over this connection
have been proposed, e.g., in the resurrecting duckling
model [25]. Approaches like Bluetooth Secure Simple
Pairing2 and WiFi Protected Setup3 use common pass-
words for authenticated key establishment between de-
vices. However, manual effort required limits scalability,
and many simple devices lack a suitable user interface to
input or verify passwords or authentication secrets. Re-
peated manual entry or verification of such secrets is also
error-prone, putting at risk the security of the approach.
What is needed is a (retail-level) scalable approach
for establishing keying relationships for large numbers of
devices, securely and reliably, avoiding anything beyond
very minor per-device human involvement or oversight.
Life-cycle key management. IoT devices may store
information and access credentials to other systems (e.g.,
the vendor cloud) that enable interaction with other de-
vices in the trust domain and access to common (config-
uration) information of the domain. This access should
depend on device membership in the domain. On any
change in domain membership, access to domain re-
sources should be updated accordingly. In particular, if
2https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications
3https://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/
wi-fi-protected-setup
membership is revoked or expires (or the device is trans-
ferred to a new owner), all existing domain-related ac-
cess credentials should be revoked. Effective means are
thus needed for managing device-held credentials for ac-
cessing other devices and resources both within and out-
side the local trust domain.
Device access control. Some IoT devices provide ac-
cess to APIs or direct terminal access for device admin-
istration and control. IoT malware (e.g., Mirai, Hajime)
have utilized weak or default passwords on administra-
tive access interfaces (e.g., ssh, telnet) to gain unau-
thorized device access and install malicious code. It is
thus necessary to protect access vectors through suitable
authentication keys (e.g., not easily guessed by IoT mal-
ware), and to ensure that any default passwords used are
replaced or disabled on domain admission.
Verifying software/firmware updates. Software
flaws, new features and optimizations result in post-sales
software (and firmware) updates; moreover, some IoT
devices may last 10-20 years, by which time vendors
may be out of business. To protect devices from unautho-
rized or flawed updates, update integrity and authenticity
must be verified. In some cases, update is irreversible
and updating to a dysfunctional image may render a de-
vice permanently unusable. A trust domain owner should
also be able to control which software updates are in-
stalled on each device, independently of the device ven-
dor or other update source.
4 Current Practice
Our framework is motivated by issues in current practice.
Current practice (device on-boarding). Current IoT
devices seldom use physical contact for authenticating a
keying relationship, in part due to the lack of standard-
ized physical interfaces and protocols for key distribu-
tion over physical connections. Keying establishment in-
volving WiFi IoT devices more commonly proceed as
follows (Figure 1). The domain owner installs a smart-
phone companion app from the device vendor, often re-
quiring the domain owner to register with a device ven-
dor’s on-line service for enhanced functionality (e.g., re-
mote access to device state while the owner is beyond the
device’s local network). On initial power-up, the device
sets up an ad-hoc WiFi access point for the domain owner
to connect to by smartphone companion app, transferring
credentials (1) for IoT device access to the trust domain’s
WiFi network. The device then connects to the local ac-
cess gateway, using the credentials received (2). After
establishing network connectivity through this gateway,
the device may connect to a vendor cloud service (3) for
any software updates, and may provide remote access to
its device state. In parallel, domain owner’s smartphone
connects to this cloud service (4) and registers the IoT
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IoT Device
Manufacturer Cloud Service
Trust Domain Owner’s 
Device
(2)
(1)
(3)
(4) Access Gateway
Figure 1: Typical process of establishing a keying rela-
tionship with current IoT devices.
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Figure 2: Guardian architecture for IoT key management
infrastructure and security gateway.
device, tying it to an owner user account.
This widely-used onboarding approach has deficien-
cies limiting its usefulness and security. Typically during
on-boarding, the domain owner must manually identify
a target IoT device’s WiFi access point (AP) to connect
to it (some companion apps attempt automated choices).
However, it is difficult to distinguish the intended de-
vice’s AP (SSIDs are often obscure), from a rogue AP,
or a non-malicious AP of a nearby unprovisioned device
not within the trust domain. Device manufacturers may
use vendor-specific device certificates to verify AP au-
thenticity to combat spoofing attacks, but this does not
preclude the app connecting to a nearby (within wireless
range) genuine same-vendor device that is not part of the
trust domain T .
Current practice (other aspects). Current practice
generally provides no guidance or accommodation for
stages described below (in our model) as generating and
keeping a device inventory, mediating software updates,
or decommissioning devices.
5 Architecture and System Model
We envisage (Fig. 2) IoT devices belonging to a trust do-
main managed by a component, the Guardian, located on
a local Security Gateway (SGW), taking the role of typi-
cal home WiFi routers. The Guardian manages all device
keys K issued to IoT devices d in the local trust domain.
It provides a management console and support for on-
boarding, key establishment (and updating/revocation),
and both verification and local approval of software up-
dates for individual devices d. For certain devices, the
Guardian may co-operate with the Manufacturer Key
Manager of an IoT device to establish the initial keying
relationship.
Threat Model. We assume that attackers begin with-
out legitimate authentication credentials/keys. We divide
adversaries into two classes: those with only remote ac-
cess, and those with local access. Remote attackers have
(wireline) access to Internet-addressable devices. Local
attackers have access to one or more of: the local wire-
line network (LAN); wireless interfaces (of individual
IoT devices and the Guardian); and physical access to
IoT devices. We assume that the Security Gateway with
the Guardian is physically protected by other means, and
do not further consider targeted attacks that physically
access it. Threats we discuss are as follows.
T1: Remote attackers trying control or manipulate IoT
devices through forged software updates.
T2: Remote attackers seeking to bypass access control
in order to access local state or reconfigure devices.
T3: Remote attackers aiming, other than by the update
process, to infect IoT devices with malware, includ-
ing the goal of denial-of-service attacks.
T4: Local attackers within range of IoT device wireless
interfaces, with any of the above objectives. For ex-
ample, this includes a rogue companion app con-
necting to a legitimate IoT device AP; and a rogue
IoT device being admitted to the trust domain. The
attacker may aim to establish a keying relationship
by tricking either device d, or the Guardian, in con-
necting to its own (rogue) device.
T5: Local attackers with physical access to a domain’s
IoT devices are beyond our scope of commodity IoT
devices and non-targeted, scalable attacks. Physical
attacks require more expensive defenses (see TEEs,
Section 7). We argue that before attempting to find
cost-efficient solutions to targeted attacks, the com-
munity is best served by entrenching baseline so-
lutions to simpler problems unaddressed in current
practice. We comment further on complementary
use of TEEs in the concluding remarks.
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Attacks should be expected on the protocol between
the Guardian and a device d during on-boarding, to re-
construct shared secrets; thus a secure protocol is neces-
sary (PAKE, below). A general attack sub-goal is to gain
access credentials to the trust domain T .
6 Guardian Design: Functionality
We give illustrative solutions to clarify the baseline func-
tionality and concrete issues it addresses; the specific so-
lution details are not the focus per se, albeit providing
an instructive base from which to build. We assume (as-
sumption A1) that all in-scope IoT devices can be “hard
reset” putting the device in a provisioning state ready to
establish a device communications key K (KG,d below);
many existing IoT devices have such a physical button.
Notation. d (IoT device), G (Guardian unit), T (trust
domain), TAP and dAP (WiFi access points of T and d).
6.1 Guardian device registry (inventory)
The Guardian is responsible for keeping an inventory
(device registry) of IoT devices authorized to be part of
the trust domain. Each device entry contains:
• unique device ID (e.g., unique serial number)
• hardware MAC address (as a secondary ID)
• device manufacturer and unit model
• common-language description (“smart plug”,
“lightbulb type xxx”, “door-lock”, “IP camera”)
• software/firmware version currently installed
• software updates available (manufacturer; other),
with reason and/or urgency code motivating each
(stability, security, functionality)
• (protected) keying material, including device-
specific access password to TAP, the Guardian or
trust domain AP.
Note: device-specific passwords to TAP address a com-
mon flaw: when devices use the same password to access
a home WiFi AP, password compromise puts all devices
at risk, yet the inconvenience of reconfiguring them all
discourages changing the password. TAP looks not for a
fixed password, but one based on incoming device MAC
addresses (from link level/Layer 2), which indexes a ta-
ble of device-specific verification data (cf. Unix).
Prior to on-boarding (Section 6.2), which populates
additional registry fields, a rostering process creates de-
vice entries as follows. Assume IoT devices have a phys-
ical sticker with QR-code (2D-barcode), indicating a se-
rial number and device-specific password for the device’s
own wireless interface. The sticker is scanned using
a companion app, creating inventory entries for all de-
vices to be on-boarded, populated with the device ID
and this to-device password; information such as MAC
address and currently installed software version can be
automatically acquired in later device interactions, while
other fields may be auto-populated including from online
sources to reduce the information needed on QR-codes,
e.g., serial number may imply manufacturer, model, de-
scription. While requiring per-device scanning, this pro-
cess avoids manual creation of device entries.
Any device not physically scanned (thus not in the
inventory) is precluded from on-boarding. An attacker
aiming to admit rogue devices into a trust domain must
introduce such devices into the pool scanned by the trust
domain owner. While a low barrier to inside-attackers in
industrial scenarios, we argue this provides a good cost-
benefit tradeoff in the target commodity IoT scenario.
In current practice (Section 4), default on-boarding
passwords are common. For devices of reasonable
size, vendors afix stickers with device-specific ran-
dom passwords, which may be derived deterministically
from scanable device IDs (serial number or MAC ad-
dress) plus optionally a vendor secret; an assembly-line
test/packaging process scans the device, computes the
password, afixes the sticker. The to-device password is
at the same time provisioned into the device, e.g., by
flashing to a particular persistent storage memory ad-
dress. The value of such passwords erodes seriously if
they are global defaults (known to buyers and attackers
alike), but may still aid on-boarding absent active attack-
ers; but device-specific to-device passwords are already
common in commodity IoT devices.
6.2 Guardian-based on-boarding
We first outline an illustrative on-boarding process for
concreteness. It uses a password-authenticated key ex-
change (PAKE) protocol,4 default-username, and pass-
word dpw pre-configured into d, as shown in Figure 3.
This key establishment process delivers device-specific
crypto-quality working keys.
1. Bring d into configuration mode (hard reset)
2. d sets up its access point dAP (open/unprotected)
3. G connects to dAP (unauthenticated/open)
4. G and d execute a PAKE using dpw as authenticator
to establish a master shared secret KG,d
5. G sends d the WiFi key, encrypted: EKG,d (KWiFi)
6. d connects to TAP over WPA2 with password KWiFi
4We suggest J-PAKE [12, 1] for practical reasons.
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IoT device 𝑑 Guardian 𝐺
connect to 𝑑𝐴𝑃 (unauthenticated)
execute PAKE(𝑑𝑝𝑤) to agree on master secret 𝐾𝐺,𝑑
𝐾𝐺,𝑑𝐾𝐺,𝑑
opens 𝑑𝐴𝑃
𝐸𝐾𝐺,𝑑(𝐾𝑊𝑖𝐹𝑖)
Trust domain 
WiFi 𝑇𝐴𝑃
connect to 𝑇𝐴𝑃 using 𝐾𝑊𝑖𝐹𝑖 as authenticator
Figure 3: Guardian-based on-boarding of an IoT device
As discussed, ideally KWiFi is a per-device crypto-grade
secret (rather than a common password shared by all de-
vices using the access point).
An advantage of the above design is that imper-
sonation by an adversary requires the password dpw.
As noted in Section 2, computing requirements im-
posed by (e.g., customized, ECDH) PAKE exclude
only extremely-constrained devices already outside our
scope; also resources for public-key operations, which
are needed only during device on-boarding (by PAKE),
are increasingly penetrating highly-constrained devices
[20]. We argue that in the near future, almost all con-
sumer IoT devices will have such capabilities, especially
if supported by standards [13]. Since an active adversary
knowing dpw could extract KWiFi, note that dpw must be
resistant to trivial online guessing.
To succeed, an attacker knowing dpw must authenti-
cate before G does. Designing d to have a “has been
on-boarded” flag allows this to be detected.
Reference monitor option. The above on-boarding
process gives d connectivity to TAP. Alternatively,
G could mediate all communications to TAP to pro-
vide firewall-like features (e.g., setting up a circuit-level
proxy). More generally—though not a focus herein—the
Guardian architecture provides a strong control point and
logical place for other security gateway services includ-
ing intrusion detection and per-device traffic (volume)
logging; and rather than facilitate access to a separate
trust domain WiFi AP (by providing access passwords
to it), could itself be the WiFi AP (or Internet gateway)
for consumer IoT devices. Applying such a network-
security based approach to consumer IoT devices, as also
suggested by others [24, 18, 6], offers strong control and
flexibility in mitigating compromised devices.
6.3 Guardian-mediated software update
Based on a list of the domain’s IoT device models,
derived from the registry, the Guardian regularly re-
freshes (based on searches of vendor web sites and other
databases) its list of available software updates for its
device roster, plus update reasons (to inform decisions
about which updates to allow). This not only allows
visibility and oversight of software and firmware up-
date of domain IoT devices, but reduces hardware sup-
port needed in end-devices and simplifies software com-
plexity. The simplification stems from no longer need-
ing end-device cryptographic support for public key sig-
nature and certificate verification; revocation checking
(which requires trusted timeclocks); and provisioning
and renewal of PKI trust anchors (a complex issue for
IoT devices, whose 5-20 year lifetimes are guaranteed to
span manufacturer reorganizations and bankruptcies).
Using its list of IoT devices and available updates,
the Guardian decides which updates to allow (based on
internal policies and/or external advice). For each, it
downloads the update, and verifies its authenticity and
integrity after having aquired and verified any necessary
trust anchors. Note this is done in a single, authoritative,
dedicated security platform (the Guardian), rather than in
a myriad of IoT devices for which security is a non-core
competency. For each IoT device in the domain approved
to receive this specific update, the Guardian does the fol-
lowing:
1. puts the device into a state ready to receive (from
the Guardian) the pre-verified update;
2. transfers the update, secured by a working key (e.g.,
previously established MAC key);
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3. instructs the device to accept the update, if the MAC
verifies (in place of a manufacturer signature).
The new baseline functionality of IoT devices must sup-
port these actions. The cryptographic requirement re-
duces to low-cost MAC verification. Trust is based on the
pre-establishing crypto keying relationship between de-
vice and Guardian. For commodity IoT devices, this can
significantly reduce both processing power required and
logistical complexity otherwise needed for secure soft-
ware/firmware update.
6.4 Guardian de-commissioning of devices
The design of the Guardian, and compliant devices, al-
lows the following, before discarding a specified IoT de-
vice for recycling.
1. A Guardian-triggered software reset achieves the
equivalent of a hard device reset: removing on-
device sensitive user data and state, including crypto
keying material, and passwords to resources includ-
ing local WiFi and internal or external resources.
2. The Guardian, as appropriate, deletes its own copies
of all passwords related to the device, keying mate-
rial, and user-related sensitive data.
3. If the device is to be re-sold or transferred, a new
device initial password will be needed by the new
owner, to access its device AP for on-boarding. We
assume that any password-bearing sticker has been
lost; a baseline solution is outlined next.
The new owner retrieves a serial number stamped on the
device exterior (in this baseline solution, this requires
visual access to scan the device portion bearing the se-
rial number). From that, a default password is retrieved
or regenerated, with co-operation of a vendor site, in a
variation of the means used to deterministically generate
initial device-instance specific passwords (Section 6.1).
A central database run by the device vendor or proxy
thereof, keeps a reset count c (indexed by serial number
s), and knows the corresponding MACaddr. A device-
specific “next-password” is then generated by combining
a vendor secret with (MACaddr, s, c). Requests made to
the vendor for a new password, accompanied by s, result
in the vendor updating c, logging an asserted owner ID
(or phone number or IP address), and returning the next
password in the sequence.
This returns a password to a new owner, but that se-
cret would not itself (yet) be in the device—so the pro-
cess requires a small twist. This new password could
be loaded into the device by a design using a physical
interface (thus also ensuring physical possession), but
this would be user-unfriendly and have other drawbacks
(e.g., the secret could be made up independent of the
vendor, an on-boarding of second-hand devices with self-
loaded secrets may abet device theft). The suggested pro-
cess is instead to use standard Lamport hash chains, i.e.,
one-time password sequences based on iterated hashing
h(h(h(...h(w)...))) with, say, t = 200 steps, for some
device-specific initial secret w. Here w0 = ht(w), the
ith password is wi = ht−i(w) and h(wi) = wi−1, so the
verifier receiving a password wi∗, asserted to be the
ith password, tests it by hashing it once and checking
against the previously stored password wi−1, i.e., test-
ing: does h(wi∗) = wi−1? So the device can easily ver-
ify the next on-boarding password (used for exactly one
on-boarding), and i = c. There is no security risk in
the device making the count c (advanced by physically
pressing the reset button, or equivalent by a soft-press)
available electronically, without device authentication;
the new owner (new owner’s Guardian) can thus obtain it
over a wireless interface, and send to the vendor site the
triplet (MACaddr, s, c), to obtain the next on-boarding
password.
6.5 Summary of baseline functionality
The lifecycle stages outlined in Section 3 map closely to
the design aspects outlined in the subsections above. We
now review security functionality provided.
The Guardian controls and manages access to individ-
ual IoT devices through established crypto-grade keys.
This is important as high-profile attacks (e.g., the Mi-
rai botnet) have used unauthorized access to IoT device
management interfaces to gain control over victim de-
vices. The Guardian also has full control over software
updates installed on particular IoT devices, and veri-
fies the updates on behalf of devices. This reduces the
risk of remote attackers installing rogue software. The
Guardian mediates which updates are installed, indepen-
dent of authorization by the device vendor, screening up-
dates based on relevant factors including evaluation of
the security, reliability, or reputation of specific updates.
It keeps a history, for all IoT devices in the domain, of
software/firmware versions installed.
We summarize baseline functionality provided by the
Guardian and related device-end support:
B1: Device inventory (rostering). A registry of all IoT
devices in the trust domain. Fields include device
ID information and device-specific password access
and crypto-grade keying material.
B2: Master key establishment. Means to establish a
master shared secret (device key K = KG,d) between
a new device d and the trust domain T . From this,
device-specific crypto working keys are derived, in-
cluding for encryption and integrity (authenticated
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encryption) of data transfers, and to convey to de-
vices the integrity of software updates approved by
the Guardian G.
B3: To-device, from-device authentication. Means
for G to authenticate into device d (i.e., into dAP,
initially by a manufacturer-provided password; up-
dated by a crypto-grade secret after master keying).
A derived working key is used for authentication of
d to G, and a device-specific key for d to use the
domain access point TAP.
B4: Key update management. Means to update and
expire any key Ki (and all keys derived from it) as-
sociated with a specified device d.
B5: Upgrade discovery. Means to discover available
software/firmware updates for rostered IoT devices.
B6: Update verification. Means for G (rather than end-
devices) to verify the integrity and authenticity of
software updates sw.
B7: Upgrade mediation. Means for G to mediate in-
stallation of any software update sw to a specified
device; B6 verifying does not guarantee approval.
B8: Removal of sensitive data on decommissioning.
Means to delete, from the device, all sensitive data
recorded by the device, plus all sensitive keying
material acquired by the device from the domain.
B9: Decommissioning support for transfer. Means to
support a new to-device access password, for low-
risk transfer of IoT devices to second owners.
Device attestation. Device attestation (e.g., see [3])
provides a means for the trust domain to test (part of) the
device operating state, e.g., to verify the correctness of
security-critical code, and detect unauthorized changes.
While ideally desirable, especially as an advanced fea-
ture in higher-value IoT devices in industrial environ-
ments, hardware support in less likely in commodity IoT
devices near-term. We thus consider device attestation
beyond the scope of baseline security functionality for
commodity IoT devices.
7 Background and Related Work
We review IoT-relevant approaches for establishing and
managing keying relationships with wireless devices.
Ad-Hoc Key Agreement. Key sharing in ad-hoc set-
tings has been a topic of active research for over 20 years.
In the resurrecting duckling model [25], a device (duck-
ling) is imprinted by a master (mother), setting up a se-
curity association (shared ignition key) when the device
first starts up. The analogy is that a newly hatched duck-
ling adopts (trusts) as its partent the first entity encoun-
tered. Such imprinting can be used by a device dedicated
to managing a domain’s IoT devices. To protect the im-
printing from imposter management devices, a sugges-
tion was physical electrical contact with the target de-
vice with the shared key transferred in plaintext over the
electrical connection. In parallel, Asokan [2] proposed
a solution for ad-hoc key agreement for a multi-device
scenario wherein a group of devices needs to establish
a common key, based on an authentication password
shared between the devices over an out-of-band channel
(vs. device-to-device security associations [25]).
Industry-driven on-boarding efforts. BRSKI [21]
and Intel Secure Device Onboard (Intel SDO) [9, 10]
are among efforts seeking a scalable approach (Section
3) to key management by pre-installing cryptographic
material on IoT devices. This supports mutual authen-
tication between a device and a trust domain’s regis-
trar, and verification that the device is authorized to join
the domain. The approach has additional requirements,
e.g., BRSKI pre-installs, into each IoT device, public-
key based “Pledge vouchers”. Intel’s solution utilizes
a dedicated hardware chip storing required key material
and using remote attestation to assure authenticity and
integrity of devices admitted to the trust domain.
Neither solution suits generic on-boarding of con-
sumer/commodity IoT devices within our scope; BRSKI
explicitly declares its scope as non-constrained devices
(above RFC 7228’s Class 2 of Section 2). Both pose rel-
atively stringent requirements on hardware and organiza-
tional set-up between device vendors and trust domains,
limiting application to specific IoT scenarios (e.g., smart
city or industrial IoT per Section 2), where required
key material can be mass-provisioned on devices pre-
deployment, and administrative measures exist for asso-
ciating and authenticating keys with individual domains.
Such measures do not suit open IoT environments with
thousands of distinct device manufacturers.
Hardware security. Hardware-based security mecha-
nisms, including trusted platform modules (TPMs) and
trusted execution environments (TEEs) such as ARM
TrustZone [11, 3], can protect security-critical informa-
tion on individual devices. They offer two advantages:
1) Improved resilience to physical attacks. Hardware-
rooted defenses raise the cost of extracting from individ-
ual devices both sensitive personal information and intel-
lectual property (e.g., algorithms). However even thor-
ough such mechanisms may fail to stop well-resourced
adversaries with physical access to targeted devices.
2) Reduced size of Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
By moving sensitive calculations to a TEE, processing
of sensitive data is effectively decoupled from generic
processing of applications on the device. Application
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software vulnerabilities then can’t be used to exfiltrate
sensitive data (e.g., keys) from the device, as all sensi-
tive operations are encapsulated inside the TEE. Only re-
sults of computations with sensitive data (e.g., encrypted
data) are returned outside the TEE. Thus the TEE pro-
vides protection against leaking of sensitive data in the
face of many software-based attacks.
An obstacle to relying on hardware-based security is
that in price-competitive commodity devices, even small
costs are barriers to wide adoption. Protection against
physical side-channel attacks is also a concern, albeit
these often require targeted attack (and are thus less scal-
able). Design approaches that minimize the impact of
key extraction are thus important—e.g., despite attempts
to protect stored keys by hardware security measures,
the risk in using global/master keys across devices was
shown by the Philips Hue smart lightbulb hack [22].
Software Updates and Ownership. Wurster [27] dis-
cusses a mechanism for controlling updates to binaries.
One or more public keys are embedded in key-locked ob-
jects; to confirm updates are from the same developer or
publisher, signed updates must be verifiable by one or
more keys in the installed version. Developer-generated
key pairs are used on intial installations in a trust-on-
first-use model, avoiding a centrally-managed PKI; the
Android OS uses a version of this approach. Smartphone
software installation and update [7] offers lessons for the
IoT world. Meteor [4] is a mobile phone application in-
stallation framework for multi-market environments (in
contrast to the single-market approaches of major smart-
phone vendors). Baton [5] offers certificate agility in a
decentralized code-signing infrastructure, to address the
requirement of transferring signing authority recognized
for software updates over time, an issue particularly rel-
evant for long-lifetime IoT devices. Khan [14] explores
automating change of ownership of IoT devices; the SE-
LIoT project [23] explores IoT life-cycle security.
Software Update Systems: TUF and successors.
TUF (The Update Framework), and its successor Diplo-
mat [16], aim to provide resilience against compromised
signing keys, while securing updates from software
repositories and community repositories; the later Up-
tane secure software update framework [15] targets ad-
ditional IoT-related complications specific to automotive
sector updates. A further update framework, CHAINIAC
[19], offers additional protections by decentralizing var-
ious roles in TUF and Diplomat, using more signing
keys, facilitating agility and signing key evolution, and
providing transparency. IoT software/firmware update is
the subject of an Internet Architecture Board report [26].
ASSURED [3] is an IoT-focused firmware update frame-
work designed to extend any update distribution scheme
(e.g., TUF), with additional functionality, e.g., verifying
successful update installation on target IoT devices.
Efficient cryptography on constrained devices. Op-
timization of cryptographic primitives is a recurring
theme, dating back to 8-bit smartcards in the 1980s. Re-
cent studies, including of elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) on 8-bit microcontrollers [20], suggest that
even constrained devices can support suitably-designed
key agreement protocols for on-boarding (Section 6).
Lightweight symmetric cryptography [8] is already suit-
ably efficient for low-resource devices, but standardiza-
tion efforts [17] are only now emerging.
8 Concluding Discussion
The suggested design for mediation of IoT-device soft-
ware updates significantly simplifies both the trust in-
frastructure needed in the short term, and the manage-
ment complexity of maintaining it over long device life-
times spanning corporate and technology evolution. This
avoids a major issue still not fully addressed in the Inter-
net of Computers (IoC): management of a global PKI in-
cluding trust anchors in end-devices, and side issues like
certificate revocation (still largely unsupported in TLS).
The design also reduces in-device support needed for
public-key cryptography to that for an IoT-tailored PAKE
for master key establishment (B2 above), and provides
domain owners visibility and control over the devices
within their trust domains through the on-boarding pro-
cess, and mediated software updates. To flexibly accom-
modate non-technical domain owners (e.g., home own-
ers), the Guardian model allows delegation of manage-
ment to service providers, allowing outsourcing.
Protection of IoT devices cannot depend solely on traf-
fic filtering methods of IP traffic, as many devices have
communication interfaces independent of the TCP/IP
stack—e.g., the noted Philips Hue hack [22] did not uti-
lize the IP stack. Risks to end-users increase with the
number of consumer IoT devices with direct WAN ac-
cess (independent of a local domain’s wireless access).
Completely removing all manufacturers from control-
ling software update is unrealistic. Premium manufac-
turers of IoT product families who focus on both us-
ability and security, may insist on end-to-end control
of software updates. Such “Class A” companies, with
long-term plans and/or full-stack expertise, are also more
likely to deploy devices with TEEs, to secure updates
(including supporting crypto verification) and intellec-
tual property, e.g., algorithms that enhance battery life
or communications; and to responsibly arrange updates
and manage trust anchors even should they vacate the
IoT business. Mediated updates do not suit them. Thus
our proposal targets “Class B” manufacturers competing
mainly on price, with many guaranteed to leave the IoT
business before 10-20 year products expire, and lacking
security expertise and motivation for long-term support.
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Vendor-specific IoT device management solutions
complementary to baseline functionality proposed herein
comes at the cost of users running multiple management
applications. Thus standardization of IoT device inter-
faces and baseline functionality appears essential to re-
duce IoT chaos in both usability and security.
Our de-commissioning design with manufacturers (or
a proxy) running centralized password databases raises
questions: what parties are suitable to run on-boarding
password service proxies for manufacturers; what incen-
tives exist for ongoing product support after an original
IoT device manufacturer discontinues its business?
The design outlined herein aims not to promote a par-
ticular solution, but as a strawman to raise issues requir-
ing immediate attention, to avoid problems 10-20 years
out. We aim to (a) highlight difficult issues to be ad-
dressed, and (b) provide a thought-experiment on IoT
device manufacturers who compete on price, and whose
products will outlive the companies themselves. Thus
our focus on “baseline requirements”. How do we, as
computer and security techologists, help the public who
buy commodity IoT products? Manufacturers will reject
the idea of government regulation, but have they any al-
ternate solutions for commodity devices?
Given the poor security track record of commodity de-
vice manufacturers, a lack of responsibility for devices
post-sale, and the certainty that many devices will outlive
the business of their manufacturers, we suggest that base-
line security requirements for commodity IoT devices re-
quire greater attention from the security community, user
communities worldwide, and government regulators.
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A IoT Device Taxonomy
A.1 IoT Device Characteristics
As noted in Section 2, here we summarize characteristics
of typical IoT devices in smart home environments and
smaller-scale industrial environments, as a main target of
our key management solutions. Appendix A.2 then uses
these characteristics to group devices in three categories.
Communication Protocols. Many commodity IoT
devices use WiFi to connect to the IP network via a lo-
cal WiFi router. However, for devices operating without
a permanent connection to the power grid, i.e., operat-
ing on battery power, WiFi may be too power-hungry
for use over prolonged periods of time. Such devices re-
sort to energy-optimised protocols like ZigBee, Z-Wave
or Bluetooth Low Energy (LE), which employ extensive
duty-cycling and relatively low-throughput communica-
tions to preserve power. For connectivity to IP-networks
these devices may use a hub device (in the case of ZigBee
and Z-Wave) or a smartphone (in the case of Bluetooth
LE) to convey messages to other devices or applications.
Exceptions are battery-powered devices using WiFi
(including smartphones) with relatively large batteries
expected to be regularly recharged; and devices operated
only intermittently, e.g., digital scales powered on only
a few times daily, which can therefore remain in deep
hibernation or completely powered off most of the time.
Power. Many IoT devices draw their power directly
from the power grid. Such devices thus typically have
limited mobility or are stationary. Other devices, for
which using a direct connection to the powergrid is not
possible, due to special device placement must operate
on battery power, e.g., if outdoors or in situations in
which wiring would be cumbersome to install or aesthet-
ically undesirable. Typical such devices include: door
and window sensors, temperature and weather sensors,
and light switches. These must operate for extended pe-
riods without requiring battery exchange and are thus
typically quite limited in functionality, e.g., dedicated to
sensing and reporting a few contextual parameters to a
hub device or smartphone.
Encryption Capabilities. Virtually all devices using
WiFi support the WPA2 encryption standard, enabling
protection of wireless communications to the local WiFi
access gateway. Low-end devices typically lack com-
putational capabilities to perform public-key operations
and must therefore resort to symmetric ciphers to protect
communications. Some recent ultra low-power MCUs
offer hardware acceleration for strong cryptographic al-
gorithms like AES-256, allowing even very low-end de-
vices to employ strong encryption for communications.
High-end devices often use public key certificates to au-
thenticate to back-end services, and standard protocols
like TLS to protect communications to the vendor site.
Software Environment. High-end devices typically
employ a full OS capable of multitasking and run-
ning programs and scripts executing arbitrary compu-
tations. Low-end devices using microcontroller-based
solutions are much more limited, typically directly ex-
ecuting firmware, with functionality limited to core de-
vice functions; introducing new functionality typically
requires installing entirely new firmware.
A.2 IoT Device Categories
As noted above, IoT Devices can be characterized ac-
cording to characteristics such as processing capability,
memory and software platform. From these factors, we
distinguish three rough categories of IoT devices—high-
end, mid-level, low-end. Table 2 categorizes selected ex-
amples of consumer IoT devices and lists some device
characteristics (e.g., communication capabilities, OS).
High-End Devices. High end devices resemble for
most parts general-purpose computers and are equipped
with a CPU and sufficient memory to run an embed-
ded multitasking-capable operating system. These de-
vices can independently communicate with their respec-
tive vendor-provided back-end services and can perform
relatively complex computation tasks. Typically they
provide a vendor-specific set of services with a related
smartphone companion app. Administrative access to the
device and services are provided through the companion
app or a web-based interface served by the back-end ser-
vice. Examples of high-end devices indlude home assis-
tants and entertainment hubs like Google Home, Amazon
Alexa and Apple TV.
Mid-Level Devices. Mid-level devices are equipped
with a CPU and an OS (e.g., an embedded version
of Linux), but have in general more limited process-
ing power and memory available. Their functionality is
therefore limited to the actual functionality of the device.
They may serve a generic (web-based) administration in-
terface to the user for administrative access (e.g., many
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IP cameras are administered this way) or, administrative
access may be facilitated with the help of a companion
app. Examples of mid-level devices are shown in Tab. 1.
The D-Link DCS-930L IP camera, Edimax SP-2101W
smart power plug, Philips Hue lighting bridge and D-
Link DCH-S150 WiFi Motion sensor are typically run-
ning a Linux-based operating system and have a rela-
tively powerful CPU with a moderate amount of mem-
ory that can be used to perform various general-purpose
computations.
Low-End Devices. These are commonly based on
microcontroller-driven SoC designs. This typically re-
sults in limited processing power and insufficient mem-
ory to host a general-purpose OS, limiting functionality
to core device functions. The Smarter iKettle 2.0 water
kettle and Netatmo Weather station are MCU-based de-
signs supported by dedicated WiFi chips—see Table 1
for example mid-level and low-end devices.
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Table 1: Hardware/software details for selected mid-level and low-end IoT devices. The aim is to provide general
context.
Device Model CPU Memory OS
Mid-level devices
5 D-Link WiFi Day Camera
DCS-930La Ralink RT5350F CPU 360 MHz 32 MB RAM 4 MB Flash Linux 2.6.21
Edimax SP-2101W Smart
Plug Switchb Ralink RT5350F CPU 360 MHz
32 / 16 kB cache, up to 64
MB SDRAM, 32 Mbit serial
Flash Linux 2.6.21
Philips Hue Bridge model
3241312018c
Qualcomm QCA4531 CPU 650
MHz 64MB RAM, 1Gb flash OpenWRT Linux
Atmel ATSAMR21E IEEE
802.15.4 (ZigBee) Cortex-M0+
48MHz
max. 32 kB SRAM max.
768 kB Flash
D-Link WiFi Motion sensor
DCH-S150 WiFi SoC 650MHz 32MB DDR SRAM OS unknown
Low-end devices
Smarter iKettle 2.0 water
kettle SMK20-EU
AI-Thinker ESP82266MOD
WiFi+MCU 80MHz MCU
64kB ROM 32 kB RAM
32kB cache 80kB user data
RAM -
STM32F015C8T6 48MHz MCU 16-64 kB Flash 8kB SRAM
Netatmo weather station
STM32F103 MCU ARM 32b-
Cortex-M3 72MHz
64-128 kB Flash 20 kB
SRAM -
USI WM-BN-BM-04 WiFi +
BTLE + FM
D-Link DCH-Z110 Door
Sensor
SD3502 General Purpose SoC Inte-
grated MCU and RF tranceiver 16 kB SRAM 128 kB Flash -
a https://wiki.openwrt.org/toh/d-link/dcs-930l
b https://community.openenergymonitor.org/t/teardown-of-edimax-smart-plug-sp-2101w-us-version/2098
c https://www.reddit.com/r/huelights/comments/3nsx4b/hue_hub_v20_teardown/
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Table 2: Classification of IoT devices (high-end, mid-level, low-end). Extremely-constrained devices (per RFC 7228)
are below low-end. Commodity devices within our scope are typically mid-level or low-end, but may include high-end
devices not managed by premium manufacturer solutions.
Identifier Device Model W
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d
high-end
AmazonEcho Amazon Echo • ◦ ◦ • ◦
AmazonEchoDot Amazon Echo Dot • ◦ • • ◦
ApexisCam Apexis IP Camera APM-J011 • • ◦ • ◦
AppleTV Apple TV • • • • ◦
CamHi Cooau Megapixel IP Camera • • ◦ • ◦
D-LinkCamDCH935L D-Link HD IP Camera DCH-935L • ◦ ◦ • ◦
D-LinkCamDCS930L D-Link WiFi Day Camera DCS-930L • • ◦ • ◦
D-LinkCamDCS932L D-Link WiFi Camera DCS-932L • • ◦ • ◦
EdimaxCamIC3115 Edimax IC-3115W Smart HD WiFi Network Camera • • ◦ • ◦
EdnetCam Ednet Wireless indoor IP camera Cube • • ◦ • ◦
GoogleHome Google Home • ◦ ◦ • ◦
SmcRouter SMC router SMCWBR14S-N4 EU • • ◦ • ◦
UbnTAirRouter Ubnt airRouter HP • • ◦ • ◦
WansviewCam Wansview 720p HD Wireless IP Camera K2 • ◦ ◦ • ◦
mid-level
D-LinkSensor D-Link WiFi Motion sensor DCH-S150 • ◦ ◦ • ◦
D-LinkSiren D-Link Siren DCH-S220 • ◦ ◦ • ◦
D-LinkSwitch D-Link Smart plug DSP-W215 • ◦ ◦ • ◦
D-LinkWaterSensor D-Link Water sensor DCH-S160 • ◦ ◦ • ◦
EdimaxPlug1101W Edimax SP-1101W Smart Plug Switch • ◦ ◦ • ◦
EdimaxPlug2101W Edimax SP-2101W Smart Plug Switch • ◦ ◦ • ◦
D-LinkHomeHub D-Link Connected Home Hub DCH-G020 • • • • ◦
HueBridge Philips Hue Bridge model 3241312018 ◦ • • • ◦
iKettle2 Smarter iKettle 2.0 water kettle SMK20-EU • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Lightify Gateway Osram Lightify Gateway • ◦ • ◦ ◦
Netatmo Netatmo weather station • ◦ • ◦ ◦
SmarterCoffee Smarter SmarterCoffee coffee machine SMC10-EU • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
TP-LinkPlugHS100 TP-Link WiFi Smart plug HS100 • ◦ ◦ • ◦
TP-LinkPlugHS110 TP-Link WiFi Smart plug HS110 • ◦ ◦ • ◦
WeMoInsightSwitch WeMo Insight Switch model F7C029de • ◦ ◦ • ◦
WeMoLink WeMo Link Lighting Bridge model F7C031vf • ◦ • ◦ ◦
WeMoSwitch WeMo Switch model F7C027de • ◦ ◦ • ◦
Withings Withings Wireless Scale WS-30 • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Aria Fitbit Aria WiFi-enabled scale • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
low-end
D-LinkDoorSensor D-Link Door & Window sensor ◦ ◦ • ◦ •
EveRoom Eve room sensor ◦ ◦ • ◦ •
EveWeather Eve weather sensor ◦ ◦ • ◦ •
FibaroMotionSensor Fibaro motion sensor ◦ ◦ • ◦ •
HomeMaticPlug Homematic pluggable switch HMIP-PS ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
HueSwitch Philips Hue Light Switch PTM 215Z ◦ ◦ • ◦ •
Osram Lightify Osram smart light bulb ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
NetatmoWind Netatmo wind gauge ◦ ◦ • ◦ •
a •= supports one or more low-energy communication protocols
b •= OS resident, ◦= no OS provided
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